
In 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron proposed an alternative to NATO and distance from the U.S., and last year President Macron condemned the U.S. decision to submarines to Australia. But columnist Arthur Cyr noted an opportunity to smooth out conflicts over policies came recently when President Macron visited President Joe Biden at the White House.
President Emmanuel Macron of France and his wife Brigitte have just completed a formal state visit to the United States hosted by President and Mrs. Joe Biden. The polished public events smooth over policy conflicts, which is, of course, their purpose.
Last year, the government of France bitterly denounced Australia’s decision to purchase nuclear submarines from the United States and Britain. This resulted in cancellation of a planned purchase of French conventional subs.
In 2015, France agreed to supply two aircraft carriers to Russia. Paris canceled that deal only after sustained pressure from allies.
In 2019, President Macron rather grandiosely proposed a European alternative to NATO and distance from the United States. This remained only a proposal — and that is key.
France began a singular, independent course after General Charles de Gaulle became president in 1958, during a severe national crisis. In the midst of growing acrimony in 1966, France demanded that NATO depart from the nation. Alliance headquarters moved to Belgium.

French President Charles de Gaulle established the Fifth Republic.
However, in 2009, France returned to full participation in the alliance. This is another key point.
Breaking away from NATO was central to President de Gaulle’s strategy. The dedicated leader of the Free French during World War II returned to national leadership in a time of an extremely grave crisis and political chaos. Defeat by Germany, then again in 1954 by communist revolutionaries in Indochina, another enervating war in Algeria and the revolving door character of post-war governments all contributed to the perception that France was a severely troubled member of the Atlantic alliance.
After returning to power, President de Gaulle skillfully employed a three-pronged strategy involving image, institutions and foreign policy. His remarkable career and personality permitted him to appeal simultaneously to French traditions of monarchism, patriotism and populism. He was aloof and also often imperious, yet skillfully used popular referenda. Enormous prestige facilitated dramatic political moves.
President de Gaulle established the Fifth Republic, including a new constitution granting exceptional executive power to the president. He rebuilt French self-confidence through emphasis on the “force de frappe,” the independent national nuclear force, plus diplomacy. The nuclear deterrent became a potent symbol of national pride and independence.
Except for Britain, a unique special partner, the United States has opposed other nations’ development of nuclear weapons. The Kennedy administration was aggressive compared to the non-confrontational Eisenhower administration in pressing U.S. policies on Europe.
The resulting clash between President John F. Kennedy and President de Gaulle made for dramatic political theater. Fascinating personalities were involved, but so were profound policy differences, unlike today.
Along with rejoining NATO, the government of France announced financial compensation for people suffering ill health from France’s nuclear tests in the atmosphere. Previously, there was reluctance even to acknowledge any health risks.
President de Gaulle’s legacy includes today’s powerful political institutions and capacity to support NATO from a position of strength. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, French aircraft patrolled North American air space. Crack French troops have been successful in Mali and other parts of Africa. President Macron actively supports the defense of Ukraine.
In 1991, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development began. France is a leading founder of this effort to spur investment in Eastern Europe. The bank today stands firmly established as a powerful engine for economic integration.
In contrast to the Cold War era, enormous economic incentives keep investment capital moving across borders — and across the Atlantic. Europe’s and the Atlantic area’s economic and military security organizations are strong.
Keep that in mind.
To learn more, read “In Search of France,” edited by Stanley Hoffmann.
Arthur I. Cyr is author of “After the Cold War – American Foreign Policy, Europe and Asia” (NYU Press and Palgrave/Macmillan). He is also the director of the Clausen Center at Carthage College in Kenosha, Wisc., and a Clausen Distinguished Professor. He welcomes questions and comments at acyr@carthage.edu.